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How the Internet routed around Cable Damage in the Baltic Sea

Internet event analysis with **RIPE Atlas**

Adonis Stergiopoulos | **GRNOG 19** | 12 December 2025

RIPE Labs





Read more on RIPE Labs:

Baltic Sea cable damage

Partial timeline (focus on initial events we analysed)

- 17 Nov 2024: BCS East-West outage
- 18 Nov 2024: C-LION1 outage
- 27 Nov 2024: BCS East-West restored
- 28 Nov 2024: C-LION1 restored
- 25 Dec 2024: C-LION1 outage
- 06 Jan 2025: C-LION1 restored
- 26 Jan 2025: LVRTC outage
- 28 Feb 2025: LVRTC restored



Baltic Sea cable damage

Media coverage

Two Baltic Sea cables disrupted – is this 'hybrid warfare'?

By **Annie Turner** - 19 November 2024

European governments point finger at Russia over Baltic cable cuts

Investigations are underway into two subsea cable breaches in the Balt
and European governments are starting to suggest that Russia is behin

Mary Lennighan
November 20, 2024

3 Min Read

Sweden opens inquiry into damaged undersea cable as Nato deploys ships

A vessel has been seized al
optic line, probably due to

Damaged cables appear to be accident, Finland says

3 December 2024

Share Save

George Wright
BBC News

December 31, 2024

Christmas Day Cable Cuts in the Baltic Sea

Written by Alexander Lott

bmarine telecommunic
Lithuania, Russia, an
In addition, an underv
ut by a ship anchor. Th
ll involving a foreign c
or over a hundred kilom
cident occurred in Oct
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

Sweden Investigates New Cable Break Under Baltic Sea

e authorities are looking into possible damage to an undersea
east of Gotland island. NATO has stepped up its surveillance
he region.

Baltic subsea cable damage was accidental, not sabotage - US and European officials

Refutes all claims of Russian sabotage

January 20, 2025 By: Niva Yadav Have your say

Subsea cable damage in the Baltic Sea in recent months was likely the result of maritime accidents, not Russian sabotage, according to several US and European intelligence officials.

As reported by The Washington Post, US and European officials have gathered evidence - including intercepted communications - which have concluded that anchors were dragged across the seabed accidentally because of inexperienced crews aboard poorly maintained

edish Coast Guard vessel in the Baltic Sea. Sweden also investigated the severing

Baltic Sea cable damage



Measuring damage with RIPE Atlas

RIPE Atlas

A global network of probes measuring the Internet in real time

13,400+ probes connected

800+ anchors deployed

35,000+ daily measurements on average (both user-defined and built-in)



Measuring damage with RIPE Atlas

Anchor mesh

RIPE Atlas anchors support ping, traceroute, DNS, HTTP/S measurements

Each anchor performs ongoing ping measurements to all other anchors at four-minute intervals

Resulting ‘mesh’ of measurements lets us observe latency changes and packet loss between anchors



First look

17-18 November

BCS East-West: Sweden-Lithuania

C-LION1: Germany-Finland

We looked at results in the RIPE Atlas anchor mesh between these countries around reported time of the event

Country	# anchors
Germany:	100
Sweden:	15
Finland:	12
Lithuania:	5



BCS East West

Latency shift

View of paths between anchors in Sweden and Lithuania, 12 hours before/after time of event

Latency increase of approx 10-20 ms shortly before 08:00 UTC on 17 November

**We subtract the minimum latency for a path during our observation period to make the latency jumps comparable*



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

BCS East West

Packet loss

Baseline of 0% packet loss

(with occasional spikes)



No significant increase in packet loss at time of the cable outage (shortly before 08:00 UTC)

C-LION1

Latency shift

View of paths between anchors in Germany and Finland, 12 hours before/after time of event

Latency increase of approx 5ms a little after 02:00 UTC on 18 November

Again: **no significant increase in packet loss**



C-LION1 repair

28 November (17:30 UTC): C-Lion1 cable repair ship reported leaving the area after successful repair

Unclear exactly what caused these latency effects and the temporary increase in packet loss…



Summing up

There was a relatively minor but visible shift in latency for around 20-30% of paths between observed anchors

But there was no concurrent increase in packet loss

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The Internet routed around damage!

Beyond the Baltic: ES-PT Power Outage April 2025

Anchor mesh measurements - potential for getting insights into outages

Power outage events much harder to measure compared to cable outage events

Due to the infrastructure being brought offline by the event itself



Deeper dive

Initial analysis was based on ping (end-to-end latency) data

We followed this up with in depth analysis using traceroute data

Aim: to examine how the paths actually changed while end-to-end connectivity was maintained



Levels of resilience

Inter-domain rerouting:

Traffic rerouted through alternative ASes/IXPs (eBGP routing protocol)

Intra-domain rerouting:

Rerouting *within* networks over alternative paths (IGP: OSPF, IS-IS)

Circuit-level rerouting:

Rerouting along alternative circuit-level connections between routers (same IP address!)



Levels of resilience

Of the 2,141 paths between anchors in Germany and Finland used for our original analysis of cable outages in the Baltic Sea, we saw rerouting at all three levels:

Inter-domain rerouting: **637 paths**

Intra-domain rerouting: **1,044 paths**

Circuit-level rerouting: **460 paths**

Read more on RIPE Labs

Resilience is not guaranteed: Côte d’Ivoire, 2024

Cable damage in Africa

14 March 2024: Submarine landslide off coast of Cote d’Ivoire resulted in damage across multiple cables:

- **ACE: Africa Coast to Europe**
- **MainOne**
- **SAT-3: Submarine Atlantic 3/West Africa Submarine Cable**
- **WACS: West Africa Cable System**

Resilience is not guaranteed: Côte d'Ivoire, 2024

Latency shift *with* packet loss

View of paths between anchors in UK and South Africa.

Latency increases of approx 20-30 ms accompanied by concurrent increase in packet loss



Resilience is not guaranteed: Red Sea, 2025

Cable damage in the Red Sea

5 September 2025: Reports emerge of cable outages in the Red Sea affecting:

- **FALCON**
- **SeaMeWe-4**
- **IMEWE**
- **Europe India Gateway (EIG)**



Resilience is not guaranteed: Red Sea, 2025

Latency shift *with* packet loss

View of paths between anchors in France and India.

Latency increases of approx 100 ms accompanied by concurrent increase in packet loss



Levels of resilience

Focus on a path between RIPE Atlas anchors - one in India, one in France - before the Red sea cable outages

We can infer that the path travelled the middle east corridor - very likely on one of the cables affected by the outage



Levels of resilience

After the outage, we can infer that packets took the Mumbai-US-Europe path instead

Detours like these suggest possible gap in redundancy - missed business opportunities with regards affordable capacity in this area

Conclusions

In the Baltic Sea:

- “The Internet routed around damage”
- Internet resilience depends on multiple levels of redundancy
    - Redundancy between networks
    - Redundancy within networks (circuit and routing)

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But resilience is not guaranteed

We have to keep monitoring, measuring, understanding

RIPE Atlas coverage - how far can we see?

RIPE NCC is a neutral source of Internet measurement data

To gain visibility into Internet events, we need vantage points

Coverage is key!

We are actively seeking hosts who can help us get RIPE Atlas probes and anchors set up in locations where they can shed light on the state of the Internet. Learn more:

RIPE Atlas coverage - how far can we see?

SEE anchors

BG: 9
RO: 7
RS: 3
HR: 1
GR: 5
AL: 1
BA: 1
SI: 3
MK: 1
ME: 0



Questions & Comments

astergiopoulos@ripe.net

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THANK YOU!